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Madsen v. Women's 
Health Center: 
INJUNCTION 
ESTABLISHING A 
36-FOOT 
BUFFER ZONE 
ON A PUBLIC 
STREET FROM 
WHICH 
DEMONSTRATORS 
ARE EXCLUDED 
DOES NOT 
VIOLATE THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT. 
The United States Su-
preme Court in Madsen v. 
Women's Health Center, 114S. 
Ct. 2516 (1994), held that an 
injunction establishing a 36-foot 
buffer zone on a public street 
from which demonstrators are 
excluded does not violate the 
First Amendment. In so hold-
ing, the Court reaffirmed the 
principle that content-neutral 
injunctions restricting speech 
pass constitutional muster ifthey 
serve a significant government 
interest and burden no more 
speech than necessary. 
In September, 1992, a 
Florida state court permanently 
enjoined anti-abortion activist 
Petitioners from blocking in-
gress and egress at Respon-
dents' abortion clinic via an ad-
jacent street, and from physi-
cally abusing persons entering 
or leaving the clinic. Six months 
later, the court broadened the 
injunction, finding: 1) access to 
the clinic was still being im-
peded; 2) the noise was ad-
versely affecting patients inside 
the clinic; 3) the protests were 
discouraging patients from ap-
proaching or entering the clinic; 
and 4) clinic staffmembers were 
being subjected to protests at 
their homes. The provisions of 
the amended injunction ex-
cluded Petitioners, and all those 
acting "in concert with" them, 
from a 36-foot buffer zone en-
compassing the clinic driveway 
and entrance, and private prop-
erty to the north and west of the 
clinic. The amended injunction 
also prohibited noisemaking 
(i.e., chanting, shouting, 
bullhorns, etc.) within earshot 
of patients within the clinic, or 
the display of "images observ-
able" to patients within the 
clinic, during surgical proce-
dures. It further restricted pro-
testors from approaching pa-
tients and potential patients with-
out their consent, within 300 
feet of the clinic. In addition, the 
injunction created a 300-foot 
buffer zone around the resi-
dences of clinic staff in which 
demonstrations or noisemaking 
. were prohibited. 
Petitioners appealed to 
the Supreme Court of Florida, 
which rejected their argument 
that the amended injunction vio-
lated the First Amendment, and 
upheld the injunction. The Court 
of Appeals of the Eleventh Cir-
cuit heard a separate challenge 
to the same injunction shortly 
before the Supreme Court of 
Florida, and struck it down. The 
United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to resolve the 
conflict. 
The Court began its 
analysis by addressing Petition-
ers' argument that the injunc-
tion was content -based because 
it restricted only the viewpoint 
of anti-abortion protestors. Id 
at 2523. In rejecting this argu-
ment, the Court reasoned that 
such a finding would "classify 
virtually every injunction as con-
tent or viewpoint based." Id 
The Court found that although 
the injunction applied only to 
individuals professing an anti-
abortion viewpoint, it was not 
dispositive of a "viewpoint-
based" restriction. Id at 2523-
24. The Court identified the prin-
cipal inquiry in determining con-
=-
tent-neutrality as whether the 
regulation is "without reference 
to the content of the regulated 
speech." Id. at 2523 (quoting 
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 
491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)). The 
Court held that the injunction's 
restrictions were not directed at 
the content of Petitioners ' mes-
sage, and it was therefore con-
tent-neutral. Id at 2524. 
The Court proceeded to 
determine what standard of re-
view should apply. It rejected 
the strict scrutiny standard, 
which requires a restriction to 
be "necessary to serve a com-
pelling state interest and nar-
rowly drawn to achieve that 
end." Id. at 2523-24 (quoting 
Perry EducationAss 'no v. Perry 
Local Educators' Ass 'n., 460 
U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). Because 
the injunction was content-neu-
tral, the Court reasoned that 
strict scrutiny, under Perry, was 
inappropriate. Id 
The Court similarly re-
jected the reasonable time, place, 
and manner test as formulated 
in Ward v. Rock Against Rac-
ism, and similar cases, reason-
ing that it applies to generally 
applicable content-neutral stat-
utes, rather than to injunctions. 
Id at 2524. The Court distin-
guished injunctions from stat-
utes, noting that injunctions are 
imposed upon those who have 
already violated, or threatened 
to violate, the law; whereas stat-
utes apply to the general public. 
Id Additionally, the Court rea-
soned that injunctions carry a 
greater threat of censorship or 
discriminatory application than 
legislation and, therefore, re-
RECENT DEVEl.OPfJlFNlS 
quire greater scrutiny. Id Hence, 
the Court determined that the 
reasonable time, place, and man-
ner test, as typically applied to 
content -neutral statutes, was not 
"sufficiently rigorous" in evalu-
ating a content-neutral injunc-
tion.ld at 2525. 
The Court subsequently 
held that the governing stan-
dard of review is whether the 
provisions of the injunction 
"burden no more speech than is 
necessary to serve a significant 
government interest." Id. (cita-
tions omitted). Thus, if the in-
junction was found to burden 
no more speech than necessary 
to meet the states objectives, it 
would pass constitutional mus-
ter. The Court then affirmed 
that the significant government 
interests noted by Florida's Su-
preme Court, such as protect-
ing a woman's right to seek 
lawful medical services, ensur-
ing the public safety and order, 
promoting the free flow oftraf-
fic, and protecting the property 
rights of all citizens, were suffi-
cient to "justify an appropri-
ately tailored injunction to pro-
tect them." Id. at 2526. 
Next, the Court turned 
its attention toward evaluating 
the challenged portions of the 
injunction. The Court upheld 
the 36-foot buffer zone around 
the clinic entrance and drive-
way, finding that it "burdened 
no more speech than necessary" 
to accomplish the government's 
goal of providing ingress to and 
egress from the clinic. Id at 
2526-27. The Court noted its 
deference to the trial court's 
determination that such a buffer 
zone was necessary in light of 
the first injunction's failure to 
accomplishthisgoal.ld at2527. 
The Court then evalu-
ated the 36-foot buffer zone as 
applied to the private property 
north and west of the clinic. 
This provision was found to be 
unconstitutional because it 
"burden [ ed] more speech than 
[was] necessary" to protect 
access to the clinic. Id. at 2528. 
The Court found no evidence 
that protestors standing in these 
areas blocked access to the clinic 
in any way. Id 
The Court upheld the 
injunction's prohibition on 
noisemaking "within earshot" 
of the clinic, reasoning that it 
"burden[ ed] no more speech 
than necessary to ensure the 
health ... of the patients at the 
clinic," particularly during pe-
riods of scheduled "surgical 
procedures". Id However, the 
Court struck down the "images 
observable" provision, stress-
ing that such a "broad prohibi-
tion" burdened more speech 
than necessary to achieve the 
purpose of limiting threats to 
clinic patients or their families 
that had allegedly been displayed 
on some signs. Id. at 2528-29. 
In justifying its decision, the 
Court noted that patients and 
staffwithinthecliniccouldmore 
easily "pull [the] curtains" than 
"stop up [their] ears." Id at 
2529. 
In striking down the 
injunction'S prohibition on 
unconsented approaches of per-
sons seeking the clinic's ser-
vices, the Court found that such 
a provision is unconstitutional 
absent "fighting words" or 
threats, and that the First 
Amendment requires us to tol-
erate insulting or even "outra-
geous" speech. Id. (quoting 
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 
322 (1988)). Further, the Court 
opined that the "consent" re-
quirement alone invalidated the 
provision because it burdened 
more speech than necessary to 
achieve the stipulated goals of 
preventing intimidation and en-
suring access to the clinic. Id. 
The last provision ad-
dressed regarded the 300-foot 
buffer zone around the resi-
dences of clinic staff. Id. at 2529-
30. The Court struck down the 
provision, finding that it consti-
tuted a broad ban on "general 
marching [or walking] through 
residential neighborhoods." Id. 
at 2530. Thus, the broad ban on 
such picketing burdened more 
speech than was necessary to 
protect the staff s residences. 
Id. 
Finally, the Supreme 
Court refused to entertain Peti-
tioners' argument that the in-
junction was invalid "as ap-
plied" to non-parties, conclud-
ing that Petitioners' lacked 
standing, as named parties, to 
make such an argument. Id. 
Similarly, the Court rejected 
their contention that the injunc-
tion was susceptible to an 
"overbreadth" challenge, find-
ing that the "in concert with" 
"phrase itself does not prohibit 
any conduct" of third parties. 
Id. (citing Regal Knitwear Co. 
v.NLRB,324U.S.9,14(1945)). 
Justice Stevens con-
curred in the opinion, but dis-
~~---------- - --- -~----------- - -- --~- ---
sented in part, arguing that in-
junctions should be judged by a 
"more lenient standard [of re-
view] than legislation", because 
they are imposed upon persons 
who have "engaged in unlawful 
conduct".Id. at 2531. Thus, he 
argued that more leeway should 
be given to injunctions, remedy-
ing the unlawful conduct of 
some, than to generally appli-
cable statutes containing identi-
cal proscriptions. Id. at 2532. 
Justice Scalia, with 
whom Justice Kennedy and Jus-
tice Thomas joined, concurred 
in the judgment in part and dis-
sented in part. Id. at 2534. Jus-
tice Scalia argued that the 
Court's decision departs com-
pletely from its past jurispru-
dence, accusing the majority of 
creating "brand-new for this 
abortion-related case, an addi-
tional standard of constitutional 
review." Id. at2537-38. In sum, 
Justice Scalia argued that both 
"precedent and policy" demand 
that strict scrutiny be applied to 
any "speech-restricting" injunc-
tions, "even content-neutral 
ones." Id. at 2541. In his view, 
"speech-restricting" inj unc-
tions may not attack "content 
as content", but they easily lend 
themselves to the "suppression 
of particular ideas" and groups. 
Id. at2538. For this reason, and 
because injunctions are issued 
by individual judges rather than 
legislatures, Justice Scalia as-
serted that an injunction restrict-
ing speech is just as deserving of 
strict scrutiny as is content-based 
legislation.ld. 
In Madsen v. Women's 
Health Center, the Supreme 
Court has explicitly denoted the 
proper standard for reviewing 
the constitutionality of content-
neutral injunctions. This stan-
dard of "heightened review", 
I ying somewhere between strict 
scrutiny and the reasonable time, 
place, and manner standard, may 
provide greater opportunity for 
portions of such injunctions to 
be upheld. However, it will si-
multaneously require such in-
junctions to "burden no more 
speech than necessary" to 
achieve their goals. With its 
decision, the Supreme Court at-
tempts to strike a balance be-
tween the rights of those wish-
ing to utilize abortion clinics 
and the rights of those attempt-
ing to protest their very exist-
ence. The Court appears willing 
to tolerate a certain degree of 
infringement upon the free 
speech of protestors in exchange 
for protection ofthe legal rights 
of others. 
- Victoria M Rife 
